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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes optimal progressive capital income taxation in an infinite horizon model
where individuals differ only through their initial wealth. We show that, in that context, progressive
taxation is a much more powerful and efficient tool to redistribute wealth than linear taxation on which
previous literature has focused. We consider progressive capital income tax schedules taking a simple
two-bracket form with an exemption bracket at the bottom and a single marginal tax rate above a time
varying exemption threshold. Individuals are taxed until their wealth is reduced down to the exemption
threshold. When the intertemportal elasticity of substitution is not too large and the top tail of the initial
wealth distribution is infinite and thick enough, the optimal exemption threshold converges to a finite
limit. As a result, the optimal tax system drives all the large fortunes down a finite level and produces a








Most developed countries have adopted comprehensive individual income tax systems with
graduated marginal tax rates in the course of their economic development process. The
United States introduced the modern individual income tax in 1913, France in 1914, Japan
in 1887, and the German states such as Prussia and Saxony, during the second half of the
19th century, the United Kingdom introduced a progressive super-tax on comprehensive
individual income in 1909. Because of large exemption levels, these early income tax
systems hit only the top of the income distribution. While tax rates were initially set at
low levels, during the rst half of the twentieth century, the degree of progressivity of the
income tax was sharply increased and top marginal tax rates reached very high levels. In
most cases, the very top rates applied only to an extremely small fraction of taxpayers.
Therefore, the income tax was devised to have its strongest impact on the very top income
earners. As documented by Piketty (2001a,b) for France, and Piketty and Saez (2001) for
the United States, these top income earners derived the vast majority of their income in the
form of capital income.1 Therefore, the very progressive schedules set in place during the
inter-war period can be seen as a progressive capital income tax precisely designed to hit
the largest wealth holders, and redistribute the immense fortunes accumulated during the
industrial revolutions of the 19th century - a time with very modest taxation of capital
income. Most countries have also introduced graduated forms of estate or inheritance
taxation that further increase the degree of progressivity of taxation. Such a progressive
income and estate tax structure should have a strong wealth equalizing eect.2
A central question in tax policy analysis is whether using capital income taxation to
redistribute accumulated fortunes is desirable. As in most tax policy problems, there is
1This is still true in France today but no longer in the United States where highly compensated
executives have replaced rentiers at the top of the income distribution.
2Indeed Piketty (2001a, b) and Piketty and Saez (2001) argue that the development of progressive
taxation was one of the major causes of the decline of top capital incomes over the 20th century in France
and in the United States.
2a classical equity and eciency trade-o: capital income taxes should be used to redis-
tribute wealth only if the eciency cost of doing so is not too large.3 A number of studies
on optimal dynamic taxation have suggested that capital taxation might have very large
eciency costs (see e.g., Lucas (1990), and Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999)). In the
innite horizon model, linear capital income taxes generate distortions increasing expo-
nentially with time. The inuential studies by Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) show
that, in the long-run, optimal linear capital income tax should be zero. Therefore, the
predictions coming out of these optimal dynamic taxation models is much at odds with
the historical and even current record of actual tax practice in most developed countries.4
This paper argues that capital income taxes can be a very powerful and desirable
tool to redistribute accumulated wealth. The critical departure from the literature that
grew out of the seminal work of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) considered here is
that, in accordance with actual income and estate tax policy practice, we consider non-
linear capital income taxation. We nd that progressive capital income taxation is much
more eective than linear taxation to redistribute wealth. Under realistic assumptions
for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, with optimal progressive taxation, even if
the initial wealth distribution is unbounded, the optimal capital income tax produces a
wealth distribution that is truncated above in the long-run. Namely, no fortunes above
3This is precisely the trade-o that was put forward in the political debate on the introduction of
progressive taxation in western countries. See Piketty (2001b) for a detailed account on the french case,
and Brownlee (2000) for the United States.
4Another strand of the literature has used overlapping generations (OLG) models to study optimal
capital income taxes. In general capital taxes are expected to be positive but quantitatively small in
the long-run (see e.g., Feldstein (1978), Atkinson and Sandmo (1980), and King (1980)). However, when
non-linear labor income tax is allowed, under some conditions, optimal capital taxes should be zero (see
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) and Ordover and Phelps (1979)). More importantly, in the OLG model,
capital accumulation is due uniquely to life-cycle saving for retirement. This contrasts with the actual
situation where an important share of wealth, especially for the rich, is due to bequests (Kotliko and
Summers, 1981). The OLG model therefore is not well suited to the analysis of the taxation of large
fortunes. I come back to this issue in conclusion.
3a given threshold are left in the long-run. Therefore, large wealth owners continue to be
taxed until their wealth level is reduced down to a given threshold. If the initial wealth
distribution is unbounded, at any time, there are still some individuals who continue to
be taxed and therefore, strictly speaking, the tax is never zero. Therefore, the policy
prescriptions that are obtained from the model developed here are well in line with the
historical record. Introducing a steeply progressive capital income tax does not introduce
large eciency costs and is very eective in reducing the concentration of capital income,
as in the historical experience of France and the United States.5
The mechanism explaining why progressive taxation is desirable can be understood
as follows. In the innite horizon model, linear taxation of capital income is undesirable
because it introduces a price distortion exponentially increasing with time. That is why
optimal linear capital income taxation must be zero in the long-run. However, with
a simple progressive tax structure with a single marginal tax rate above an exemption
threshold, large wealth holders will be in the tax bracket and therefore will face a lower
net-of-tax rate of return than modest wealth holders who are in the exempted bracket.
As a result, the innite horizon model predicts that large fortunes will decline until they
reach the exemption level where taxation stops. Thus, this simple tax structure reduces
all large fortunes down to the exemption level and thus eectively imposes a positive
marginal tax rate only for a nite time period for any individual (namely until his wealth
reaches the exemption threshold) and thus avoids the innite distortion problem of the
linear tax system with no exemption.6 The second virtue of this progressive tax structure
is that the time of taxation is increasing with the initial wealth level because it takes
more time to reduce a large fortune down to the exemption threshold than a more modest
5As mentioned above, the revival of income inequality in the last three decades in the United States
is a labor income (and not a capital income) phenomenon.
6Piketty (2001a) made the important and closely related point that, in the innite horizon model, a
constant capital income tax above a high threshold does not aect negatively the long-run capital stock
in the economy because the reduction of large fortunes is compensated by an increase of smaller wealth
holdings. This, of course, is not true with linear capital income taxation.
4one. This turns out to be desirable in general for the following reason. Large wealth
holders consume mostly out of their initial wealth rather than their annual stream of
labor income. Therefore, the positive human wealth eect created by capital taxation
on initial consumption is small relative to the income eect for large wealth holders. As
a result, capital taxation leads to a lower pace of wealth decumulation for the rich, and
thus they can be taxed longer at a lower eciency cost than the poor. It is important
to recognize however, that the size of behavioral responses to capital income taxation,
measured by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, matters. When this elasticity is
large, it is inecient to tax any individual, however rich, for a very long time and thus,
it is preferable to let the exemption level grow without bounds as time elapses producing
an unbounded long-run wealth distribution.
It is important to understand that the parsimonious model developed here does not
capture all the relevant issues arising with capital income taxation. The present model
takes as given the initial unequal wealth distribution, and ignores completely the issue
of creation of new wealth. This contribution can be seen as a theory of the taxation
of rentiers where the central trade-o is the following: using capital income taxation is
desirable to redistribute from the rich to the poor but capital income taxation induces
individuals to over-consume initially and run down their wealth levels, hence reducing the
capital income tax base down the road. This basic model therefore ignores completely
the issue of creation of new fortunes. New fortunes are created in general by successful
entrepreneurs. Taxation of capital income reduces the (long-term) benets of creating a
fortune, and may thus reduce entrepreneurial eort as well.7 Conversely, in models with
entrepreneurs, income risk cannot be fully insured. In that context, recent studies by
Aiyagari (1995), Chamley (2001), and Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2001) have
shown that capital income taxation may be desirable, even in the long run. Therefore, it
7Cagetti and De Nardi (2002) propose a positive analysis of capital income taxation and the wealth
distribution in a dynamic and stochastic model with entrepreneurs. They do not, however, tackle the
normative issue of optimal capital income taxation.
5is not immediately clear in which direction would the introduction of entrepreneurs tilt
the results presented here. A more general optimal tax model encompassing the creation
of new fortunes is left for future research.8 We expect, however, that the economic forces
regarding the taxation of rentiers described here would still be present in this more general
model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the government
objective. Section 3 considers linear taxation and provides useful preliminary results
on the desirability of taxing richer individuals longer. Section 4 introduces progressive
capital income taxation and derives the key theoretical results. Section 5 proposes some
numerical simulations to illustrate the results and discusses policy implications. Section 6
analyzes how relaxing the simplifying assumptions of the basic model aects the results.
Finally, Section 7 oers some concluding comments.
2 The General Model
2.1 Individual program
We consider a simple innite horizon model with no uncertainty and perfectly competi-
tive markets. All individuals have the same instantaneous utility function with constant
intertemporal elasticity of substitution : u(c) = [c1 1=   1]=[1   1=]. The elasticity 
is the key parameter measuring how sensitive individuals are to capital income taxation
(see below). When  = 1, we have of course u(c) = logc. All individuals discount the
future at rate  > 0 and maximize the intertemporal utility U =
R 1
0 u(ct)e tdt. We make
the following simplifying assumption:
Assumption 1 The real interest rate is exogenous and constantly equal to the discount
rate , the wage is exogenous, equal across individuals, and over time to a given value w.
8Conesa and Krueger (2002) compute numerically optimal non-linear income taxes in such a dynamic
model with uninsurable stochastic labor income risk. Optimal taxes are well approximated by a at tax
rate above an exemption threshold.
6We show in Section 6.1 how assumption 1 can be relaxed without aecting the results.
This assumption can be interpreted as the small open economy assumption where indi-
viduals can lend and borrow from abroad at a constant world market interest rate .9
We denote by at, the individual wealth level at time t. We assume that individuals dier
only through their initial wealth endowment a0.10 The population is normalized to one
and the cumulated distribution of initial wealth is denoted by H(a0), and the density by
h(a0).
The government implements a capital income tax schedule possibly non-linear, and
time varying denoted by It(:), and distributes uniform (across individuals) lump-sum
benets bt. As a result, we adopt without loss of generality the normalization It(0) = 0;
that is, taxes are zero for individuals with no capital income. We denote by yt = wt + bt
the annual stream of non capital income. The individual wealth accumulation equation
(1) can be simply written as
_ at = at   It(at) + yt   ct: (1)
Maximizing utility subject to the budget constraint (1) leads to the usual Euler equation
_ ct
ct
= [(1   I
0
t(at))   ]: (2)
Equations (1) and (2) combined with the initial condition a(0) = a0, and the transver-
sality condition dene a unique optimal path of consumption and wealth. We denote by
U(a0) the utility of individual with initial wealth a0, and by Tax(a0) the present dis-
counted value (using the pre-tax interest rate) of tax payments of the individual with
initial wealth a0. Of course, utility and taxes depend on the path of tax schedules (It(:))
and the size of government benets bt.
9The exogenous rate is taken as equal to the discount rate so that the economy converges to a steady
state (see below).
10We discuss later on how introducing wage income heterogeneity may aect the results.
72.2 Government Tax Instruments
 Government Objective
The government uses capital income taxation to raise an exogenous revenue require-
ment gt and to redistribute a uniform lumpsum grant bt to all individuals. We assume that
the government maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function
R
A0 U(a0)dH(a0) subject
to the budget constraint
Z
A0
Tax(a0)dH(a0)  B + G (3)
where B and G denote the present discounted value (at pre-tax interest rates) of govern-
ment benets bt and exogenous spending gt. Total taxes collected must nance the path
of lumpsum grants bt and government spending gt. We denote by p the multiplier of the
budget constraint (3). The analysis can be extended to more general social welfare func-
tions. However, to keep the presentation simple, we focus rst on the utilitarian case, and
present the results for the general case in Section 6.3. We make the following additional
simplication assumption:
Assumption 2 The path of government lumpsum grants bt is restricted to be constant
overtime.
Assumption 2 requires some explanations. Implicit in equation (3) is the assumption
that the government can use debt paying the same pre-tax rate as capital. We will
see below that when all individuals face the same after-tax interest rate as in Chamley
(1986), debt is neutral and does not allow the government to improve welfare. However,
with non-linear capital income taxation, dierent individuals typically face dierent after-
tax interest rates and debt is no longer neutral and can be used to improve welfare. We
discuss in detail in Section 6.2 how debt can be used in conjunction with non-linear taxes
to improve redistribution. Assumption 2 is a way to freeze the debt instrument by forcing
the government to redistribute tax proceeds uniformly over time.
 First Best Taxation
8Ideally, the government would like to make a wealth levy at time zero in order to nance
all future government spending and equalize wealth if it cares about redistribution. As
initial wealth is exogenous, this wealth levy is rst-best Pareto ecient.11
 Capital Income Taxation
In the analysis that follows, we assume, as in the literature, that the government
cannot implement a wealth levy and has to rely on distortionary capital income taxation.
If there is no constraint on the maximum capital tax rate that the government can use,
then, as shown in Chamley (1986), the government can replicate the rst-best wealth levy
using an innitely large capital income tax rate during an innitely small period of time.
It is therefore necessary to set an exogenous upper-bound on the feasible capital income
tax rate.
Assumption 3 The capital income tax schedules are restricted to having marginal tax
rates always below an exogenous level  > 0.
We believe that this assumption captures a real constraint faced by tax policy makers.
In practice, wealth levies happened only in very extraordinary situations such as wars,
or after-war periods.12 The political debates preceding the introduction of progressive
income taxes in the United Kingdom in 1909, France in 1914, or the United States in
1913 provide interesting evidence on these issues. Populist and left-wing parties were the
promoters of progressive income taxation for redistributive reasons and to curb the largest
wealth holdings. Fierce opposition from the right prevented the implementation of more
11This perfect equalization is similar to the perfect equalization of after-tax income that takes place in
a static optimal income tax model with no behavioral response and decreasing (social) marginal utility
of consumption.
12For example, just after World War II, the French government conscated property of the rich indi-
viduals accused of having collaborated with the Nazi regime during the occupation. These conscations
were de facto a wealth levy. Similarly, Japan, in the aftermath of World War II applied, conscatory tax
rates on the value of property in order to redistribute wealth from those who did not suer losses from
war damage to those who did.
9drastic redistributive policies such as wealth levies. Therefore, the situation where the
government can only use income taxation to redistribute wealth is perhaps relevant in
practice because of political constraints.
 Consumption Taxation
As explained by Chari and Kehoe (1999), the rst best wealth levy can be replicated
with large consumption taxes (uniform over time) combined with a large lumpsum sub-
sidy. Such a combination of taxes would make initial wealth less valuable, but would not
distort relative prices. In the limit where these taxes and subsidies go to innity, initial
wealth becomes irrelevant and complete equalization is obtained as in the rst best wealth
levy. Such an extreme policy is certainly unrealistic. However, the point remains that
consumption taxes, even without going to the extreme case described above, would be
more ecient than capital income taxation alone because they would allow to replicate
more closely a wealth levy than capital income taxation.13 It is an interesting question
why the political debates surrounding the introduction of progressive income taxation to
curb large wealth holdings did not consider consumption taxation as a feasible means
to redistribute wealth. In this paper, we will follow on the optimal capital income tax
literature and ignore the possibility of consumption taxation.
2.3 Responses to Taxation
 The central trade-o
The derivation of optimal capital taxes relies critically on the behavioral responses to
taxation and the induced eect on wealth accumulation. With no taxation (It(:) = 0),
the Euler equation (2) implies that the path of consumption is constant (ct = c0 for all
t), and thus wealth at is also constant (otherwise the transversality condition would be
violated). Consumption is equal to labor income and benets plus interest income on
13It is well known that switching from income taxation to consumption taxation would amount to
taxing existing wealth. See Auerbach and Kotliko (1987) for such an analysis in an OLG model.
10wealth (c = y + a0). This case is depicted on Figure 1 in straight lines. Therefore, in
that situation, the wealth distribution remains constant over time and equal to the initial
wealth distribution H(a0).
In the presence of taxation, let us denote by  rt = (1 I0
t(at)) the instantaneous after-
tax interest rate, and by  Rt =
R t
0  rsds the cumulated after-tax interest rate. The Euler
equation (2) can be integrated to obtain ct = c0e(  Rt t). Thus a positive and constant
over time marginal tax rate  produces a decreasing pattern of consumption over time
ct = c0e t, as depicted on Figure 1 (in dashed line). In that case, the high initial
level of consumption in early periods has to be nanced from the initial wealth stock.
Therefore, positive marginal tax rates produce a declining pattern of wealth holding as
shown on Figure 1.
Figure 1 illustrates well the equity-eciency trade-o that the government is facing.
On the one hand, the government would like to use capital income taxation to redistribute
wealth from the rich to the poor because this is the only instrument available. On the
other hand, using capital income taxation leads the rich rentiers to run down their wealth,
which reduces the capital income tax base in later periods.
 Tax Revenue
In order to derive optimal tax results, it is useful to assess how a change in taxes aects
tax revenue. The present discounted value (at pre-tax interest rates) of taxes collected on
a given individual is equal to Tax(a0) =
R 1
0 It(at)e tdt. Integrating equation (1), and
using the transversality condition, one obtains that taxes collected are also equal to initial
wealth a0 plus the discounted value of the income stream y less the discounted value of
the consumption stream ct:











(  Rt t) tdt: (4)
This equation shows clearly how a behavioral response in c0 due to a tax change triggers
a change in tax revenue collected. A very large c0 (consequence of high marginal tax rates
and a distorted consumption pattern as in Figure 1) may imply a lower level of taxes
11collected.
 Eect of Taxes on initial consumption
Initial consumption c0 is dened so that the transversality condition is satised. The
response of c0 to capital income taxation is critical to assess the eect of changes in
taxation on the tax base (as illustrated on Figure 1), and hence, on taxes collected (as
shown in equation (4)).
An increase in the capital income tax rate at time t produces an increase in the
consumption prices e   Rt after time t. As is well known, this increase in prices after time
t leads to three eects on c0. First, there is a substitution of consumption after t toward
consumption before t leading an increase in c0. Second, the increase in prices leads to a
negative income eect on consumption and thus on c0. As usual, when  = 1 (log utility
case), income and substitution eects exactly cancel out. Third, the increase in prices also
increases the value of the income stream yt and thus produces a positive human wealth
eect on consumption and hence on c0. These three eects will show up in the optimal
tax analysis below.
3 Linear Taxation and Preliminary Results
In this section, we examine individual consumption and wealth accumulation decisions
under linear taxation. We then investigate whether it would be ecient for the government
to tax (using individual specic linear taxation) richer individuals for a longer period of
time. As progressive taxation allows precisely to discriminate taxpayers based on the size
of their capital income (or equivalently wealth), the results obtained in this section will
be of much use to tackle the optimal progressive income tax problem.
123.1 Linear Income Taxes and Individual Behavior
We consider rst the case where the government implements linear capital income taxes
(possibly time varying). As the policy which comes closest to the rst-best wealth levy is
to tax capital as much as possible early on, the optimal policy consists in imposing the
maximum tax rate  on capital income up to a time T and zero taxation afterwards. This
\bang-bang" pattern of taxation was shown to be optimal in a wide class of dynamics
models by Chamley (1986). For notational simplicity, we assume that  = 1, that is, the
maximum rate is 100%.14
Let us assume therefore that the government imposes a linear capital income tax with
rate 100% up to time T, and with rate zero after time T. In the notation introduced in
Section 2,  Rt = 0 if t  T and  Rt = (t   T) if t  T. After time T, the Euler equation
(2) implies that _ ct = 0, and thus constant consumption ct = cT. As y = w + b is also
constant, wealth at must also be constant after time T and such that cT = at + y.
Before time T, the Euler equation implies _ c=c =  , and therefore ct = c0e t. The
wealth equation implies _ at = y   ct, and therefore using the initial condition for wealth,
we have








There is a unique value c0 such that the path for wealth (5) for t = T matches the constant
path of wealth aT = (c0e T   y)= after T
c0 =
[y + (y  T + a0)]
1   (1   )e T : (6)
We denote by a1(a0) and c1(a0) the (constant) values of wealth and consumption after
time T. The individual patterns of consumption and wealth are depicted in straight lines
















14The key results are independent of the maximum tax rate  (see below).
133.2 Uniform Linear Taxes
In this subsection, we consider the case where the government has to set the same linear
taxes on all individuals. This is the standard case studied in the literature. In that
case, the time of taxation T has to be the same for all individuals. The optimal time





A0 Tax(a0)dH(a0)   b=   G
i
, and taking the rst order conditions with respect to b
and T.
The interesting point to note is that this type of taxation does not qualitatively change
the nature of the wealth distribution in the long-run. Using (5) and (6) for large values of
a0, it is easy to show that a1(a0)    a0 where 0 <  = e T=(1   (1   )e T) < 1.
Therefore, large fortunes are reduced by a proportional factor  < 1, but the shape of
the top tail of the wealth distribution is not qualitatively altered. For example, if the
initial wealth distribution is Pareto distributed at the top with parameter , then the
distribution of nal wealth will also be Pareto distributed with the same parameter .
The interesting question of how much redistribution of wealth is achieved by the optimal
set of linear taxes, as a function of the parameters of the model and the redistributive
tastes of the government, has not been investigated with numerical simulations in the
literature.
3.3 Wealth Specic Linear Income Tax
In this subsection, we assume that the government can implement linear capital income
taxes (possibly time varying) that depend on the initial wealth level a0. This set-up does
not correspond to a realistic situation but it is a helpful rst step to understand the
mechanisms of wealth redistribution using capital income taxes in the innite horizon
model. As a direct extension of the Chamley (1986) bang-bang result, it is easy to show
that the optimal policy for the government in that context is to impose the maximum
allowed tax rate  on capital income up to a time period T(a0) (which now depends on
14the initial wealth level) and no tax afterward. There are two interesting questions in that
model. First, how does T vary with a0? That is, does the government want to tax richer
individuals longer? and for which reasons (redistribution, eciency, or both)? Second,
what is the asymptotic wealth distribution when the set of optimal wealth specic income
taxes is implemented?
To simplify the notation, we assume again that  = 1 (this does not aect the nature of
the results). In this context, the government chooses the optimal set of time periods T(a0),
and benets levels b that maximize social welfare subject to the budget constraint (3).
The rst order condition with respect to T(a0) is @U(a0)=@T(a0)+p@Tax(a0)=@T(a0) = 0.
This condition states that an individual with initial wealth a0 should be taxed up to the
time T(a0) such that the social welfare loss created by an extra time of taxation is equal
to the extra revenue obtained. We show formally in appendix the following proposition.











Therefore, the asymptotic wealth distribution is bounded.
 If  > 1, then asymptotically (i.e., for large a0), T(a0) converges to a nite limit
T 1, and a1(a0)  a0  e T1=[1 + (   1)e T1].
It is important to understand the economic intuitions behind the proof Proposition
1. As shown on Figure 2, when the time of taxation T is increased by dT, there are two
eects on taxes collected. First, as the time of taxation increases, taxes are collected for
a longer time, increasing mechanically tax revenue. Second, the tax change produces a
behavioral response which might increase (or decrease) c0 and hence decrease (or increase)
the path of wealth at, inducing an decrease (or increase) in taxes collected before time T
(Figure 2 depicts the case where c0 increases). Let us analyze the eect of T on c0. Using




y   c0e T + c0e T
1   (1   )e T : (9)
15Therefore, as displayed in the numerator of (9) and as discussed informally in Section
2.3, the marginal eect of T on c0 can be decomposed into three eects. The rst term
in the numerator of equation (9) is the human wealth eect: when the time of taxation
increases, the present discounted value of the income stream y increases and thus con-
sumption goes up. The human wealth eect is positive goes away when the individual
does not receive any income stream (y = 0). The second term is the income eect and is
negative: a longer time of taxation increases the relative price of consumption after time
T and thus reduces c0 through an income eect. The third and last term is the substi-
tution eect and is positive: increasing the price of consumption after time T relative to
before time T shifts consumption away from the future toward the present and produces
an increase in c0. As always, when  = 1, the income and substitution eects exactly
cancel out.
When  > 1, the substitution eect dominates the income eect. Thus, increasing
T unambiguously increases c0, producing a reduction in tax revenue (case depicted on
Figure 2). The mechanical increase in tax revenue is due to extra tax collected between
times T and T + dT. Because of discounting at rate , this amount is small relative to
dT when T is large. As a result, the behavioral response tax revenue eect dwarves the
mechanical increase in tax revenue if T is large. As the welfare eect of increasing T is
also negative, T can clearly not grow without bounds when a0 grows. Therefore, T has
to converge to a nite limit T 1 no matter how strong the redistributive tastes of the
government.
Therefore, in the case where  > 1, wealth specic capital income taxes are not
a very useful tool for redistributing wealth because the behavioral response to capital
income taxes is very large. As a result, taxes are zero after a nite time T 1 and the
resulting wealth distribution is not drastically aected by optimal capital taxation (as in
the uniform linear tax case of Section 3.2).
When  < 1, the income eect dominates the substitution eect. For large a0, initial
consumption c0 is large relative to y (because the capital income stream dwarves the
16annual income stream y). Thus, and as can be seen from equation (9), unless T is large,
the income eect (net of the substitution eect) dwarves the human wealth eect, and
therefore the response in c0 is going to be negative, generating more tax revenue. Thus, at
the optimum, T must grow without bounds when a0 grows so that the income eect (net
of the substitution eect) is compensated by the human wealth eect.15 Therefore, using
the numerator of (9), T must be such that (1   )c0e T  y, implying that long-run
consumption must be such that cT  y=(1   ), and therefore the long-run wealth level
needed to nance this consumption stream is aT  (y=)  =(1   ) as stated in (8).
Therefore when the elasticity of substitution  is below unity, the government would
like to tax larger fortunes longer until they are reduced to a nite threshold given in (8).
If the initial wealth distribution is unbounded, at any time t no matter how large, there
will remain (at least a few) large fortunes that continue to be taxed. This result is a
signicant departure from the zero tax result of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985). In the
long run, the largest fortunes produce a stream of interest income equal to y=(1 ). For
example, with  = 1=2 (not an unrealistic value, see below), the largest fortunes would
only allow their owners to double their labor plus government benets annual stream of
income.
It is important to note that this result relies on the fact that, for the very wealthy,
annual labor plus benets income y is small relative to the stream of capital income, and
therefore the human wealth eect is small relative to the income eect. This result needs
to be qualied when y is positively related to a0. If the wealthy have a labor income stream
proportional to their initial wealth, then the human wealth eect will be of the same order
as the income eect for nite T. In that case, asymptotic wealth will be proportional to
y, and hence to a0 producing an unbounded asymptotic wealth distribution. Therefore,
the theory developed here shows that taxing wealthy rentiers is much more desirable than
taxing capital income from the working rich.
15One can check that, for large a0, the welfare eect is small relative the increase in tax revenue.
174 Optimal Progressive Taxation
Obviously, the wealth specic linear income tax analyzed in the previous section is not a
realistic policy option for the government. However, in practice, the government can use
a tool more powerful than uniform linear taxes as in the Chamley (1986) model, namely
progressive or non-linear capital income taxation. As discussed in the introduction, actual
tax systems often impose a progressive tax burden on capital income. Many countries,
including the United States, impose estate or inheritance taxation with substantial ex-
emption levels and a progressive structure of marginal tax rates. Most individual income
tax systems have increasing marginal tax rates and capital income is often in large part
included in the tax base, producing a progressive capital income tax structure. In the
United States (and in many other countries as well), the development of tax-exempted
instruments to promote retirement savings such as Individual Retirement Accounts and
401(k) plans that are subject to maximum annual contribution levels also create a pro-
gressive structure.
Non-linear capital income taxes in the innite horizon model are appealing, in light
of our results on wealth specic linear taxation, because a non-linear schedule allows
to discriminate among taxpayers on the basis of wealth. A progressive tax structure can
impose high tax burdens on the largest fortunes while completely exempting from taxation
modest fortunes.16
4.1 A Simple Two-Bracket Progressive Capital Tax
The progressive tax structure that comes closest to the wealth specic linear taxation is
the following simple two-bracket system. At each time period t, the government exempts
from taxation all individuals with wealth at below a given threshold a
t (possibly time
varying), and imposes the maximum marginal tax rate  on all capital income in excess
16Obviously, progressive taxation cannot be as ecient than the wealth specic linear taxation of
Section 3.3 because reduced marginal tax rates for low incomes lowers the tax burden on higher incomes.
18of a
t, as depicted on Figure 3. Note that the progressive schedule creates a virtual
income mt = a
t for those in the tax bracket.
None of our results are sensitive to the level of . Therefore, to simplify the presen-
tation, we consider in the text the case  = 1. In that case, It(at) = 0 if at  a
t, and
It(at) = (at  a
t) if at > a
t. Because, we have adopted the normalization It(0) = 0, we
assume that a
t  0 so that individuals with zero wealth have no tax liability.17 We also
impose the condition that the exemption threshold a
t is non-decreasing in t (see below




sds the integral of the function a
t.
The dynamics of consumption and wealth accumulation of this progressive tax model
are very similar to those with the wealth specic linear tax and are depicted on Figure
4. Individuals (with initial wealth a0 > a
0) rst face a 100% marginal tax rate regime.
From the Euler equation (2), their consumption is such that ct = c0e t, and their wealth
evolves according to _ at = a
t + y   ct, implying
at = a0 + A









The only dierence with equation (5) is the presence of the extra-term A
t due to the
presence of the exemption threshold. As a
t is non-decreasing and ct is decreasing, _ at is
increasing. It is easy to show that wealth at declines up to point where it reaches a
t. This
happens at time T (which depends of course on a0) such that a
T = a0 + A
T + y  T  
c0(1   e T)=().
After time T, the individual is exempted from taxation and therefore has a at con-
sumption pattern ct = c0e T and a at wealth pattern at = a
T = (cT  y)=. Therefore,
as depicted on Figure 4, the pattern of consumption is exponentially decreasing up to
time T and at afterwards. The wealth pattern is also declining up to time T, and at
afterwards.18 We denote as above the (constant) levels of consumption and wealth after
17It would be optimal for the government to set a
t large and negative for low t in order to replicate a
lumpsum tax at time zero which would be equivalent to a wealth levy. Imposing the constraint a
t  0
eectively rules out this possibility.
18Note that, as depicted on Figure 4, at t = T, the wealth pattern is at because _ at = a+y c0e t =
19time T by c1(a0) and a1(a0). Obviously, individuals with higher wealth remain in the
tax regime longer than individuals with lower wealth: for any given path a
t, the time
of taxation T(a0) is increasing in a0.19 Routine computations paralleling the analysis of
Section 3.2 show that
c0 =
[y + (y  T + A
T + a0)]
1   (1   )e T : (11)


















Note that expression (12) is identical to expression (7). For a given initial consumption
level c0 and a given time of taxation T, the non-linear tax system raises exactly the same
amount of taxes than the linear tax system. The key dierence appears in equation (11):
the initial level of consumption c0 contains an extra-term A
T reecting the extra virtual
income due to the exemption of taxation below the threshold a
t. From now on, we call
this eect the virtual income eect.
This non-linear tax system may improve substantially over the uniform linear tax
system  a la Chamley (1986) because large wealth holders can be taxed longer than poorer
individuals.20 For low values of , our previous results suggest that this is a desirable
feature of the tax system. The non-linear tax system, however, is inferior to the wealth
specic capital income tax of Section 3.3 because it exempts wealth holdings below a
t
from taxation and creates a positive virtual income eect on c0, and thus is not as ecient
to raise revenue.
0 when t = T).
19The assumption that a
t be non-decreasing in time is important and simplies considerably the
analysis. If a
t were decreasing in some range, then individuals who were out of the tax bracket may
enter the tax regime again, producing complicated dynamics. As we discuss below, we are interested on
whether a
t diverges to innity when t grows, therefore the constraint a
t increasing is not an issue for our
analysis.
20The uniform tax system of Section 3.2 can be seen as a particular case of non-linear taxation with
a
t =  1 up to time T and a
t = 1 after T.
20The central question we want to address is about the optimal asymptotic pattern
for a
t. Does a
t tend to a nite limit a
1, implying that, in the long-run, the wealth
distribution is truncated at a
1? Or does it diverge to innity, implying that the wealth
distribution remains unbounded in the long-run?
4.2 Optimal Asymptotic Tax
To tackle this question, let us assume that a
t is constant (say equal to a) after some large
time level  t. I denote by  a0 the wealth level of the person who reaches the exemption
threshold a at time  t, that is, such that T( a0) =  t. Let us consider the eects of the
following small tax reform. The exemption threshold a is increased by a for all t above
 t as depicted on Figure 5. Only individuals with initial wealth high enough (such that
a0 >  a0) are aected by the reform. We denote by c0, T, and at the changes in c0,
T(a0), and at induced by the reform. We rst prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1 For large  t (and hence T), we have
c0  [(T    t)   ]a
: (13)
The formal proof follows from the dierentiation of equations (11) and c0e T =
a+y. These dierentiated equations express the endogenous c0 and T in terms of the
exogenous a. Eliminating T, we can obtain c0 =   [(T    t)   1]a=(1   e T).
When  t (and hence T) is large, this equation can be approximated as (13). QED.
Let us provide the economic intuition. The small reform increases the virtual income
mt by a between times  t and T. As can be seen from (11) assuming T is large, this
produces a direct positive virtual income eect (T   t)a on c0. This is the rst term
in (13).
As can be seen on Figure 5, after the reform, the time needed to reach the exemption
threshold is reduced by T < 0 because the exemption threshold is higher. This change in
21T produces a pure negative substitution eect on c0.21 For large  t and hence T, equation
(11) shows that the substitution eect on c0 is approximately e Tc0T =  a.22
This is the second term in (13).
Equation (13) shows that increasing the exemption threshold induces a positive eect
on consumption for individuals with large T (i.e. large a0) and a negative eect for those
whose T is close to  t (i.e., the poorest individuals aected by the reform). The explanation
is the following: individuals with large T benet from the increased exemption for a long
time and thus the direct virtual income wealth eect is large, and therefore they can
aord to consume more. Individuals with T close to  t do not benet from this wealth
eect and face only the indirect substitution eect: they reach the higher exemption
threshold sooner and thus the reform reduces the price of consumption after T relative to
consumption before T and thus they reduce their initial consumption level.
It is useful to change variables from T to a0. Using equation (11), we have, for T large,
c0  a0. Thus, as c0e T = y + a, we have T  loga0 + log()   log(y + a).
Applying this equation at T and T =  t (remembering that T( a0) =  t), we can rewrite
(13) as c0  [log(a0= a0)   ]a. Using equation (12), and the expression for c0 just













Equation (14) shows that increasing the exemption threshold above  a0 increases the
tax liability of the rich for whom a0 is slightly above  a0 (the substitution eect reducing
c0 dominates) and decreases the tax liability of the super-rich for whom a0 is far above
 a0. The net eect over the population is therefore going to depend on the number of
super-rich relative to the number of rich. Integrating equation (14) over the distribution
21As cT = a
T +y, the income eect and the human wealth eect (which must also include the virtual
income a
T exactly cancel out.
22T is obtained by dierentiating c0e T = y + a.
23The exact formula, valid for any  t and T is given in appendix.














[   A( a0)]  [1   H( a0)] (15)
where A( a0) = E(log(a0= a0)ja0   a0) is the normalized average log of wealth holding
above  a0. From equation (14), it is easy to see that the direct virtual income eect of the
reform is captured by the term A( a0) in the square brackets while the indirect substitution
eect is simply the term  in the square brackets.
 Bounded Initial Wealth Distribution
If the initial wealth distribution is bounded with a top wealth a
top
0 , then when  t is close
to the maximum time of taxation,  a0 is close to a
top
0 , and A( a0) is close to zero. As a result,
equation (15) shows that the eect of the reform on tax revenue is unambiguously positive
because, as discussed above, the virtual income eect is dominated by the substitution
eect.
As the welfare eect is also obviously positive, it is always benecial for the government
to increase the exemption level at the top starting from a situation with constant a close
to the top. This reform improves the incentives of the richest individual to accumulate
wealth and thus would increase his tax liability while producing no eect on all the other
taxpayers. This feature is similar to the zero top rate result in the Mirrlees (1971) model
of optimal income taxation. In the Mirrlees model, a positive top marginal tax rate
is suboptimal because reducing it would improve the incentives to work of the highest
income individual (and hence his tax liability) without aecting anybody else.
 Unbounded Initial Wealth Distribution
If the initial wealth distribution is unbounded, then, in the present model, by increasing
the exemption level above  t, the government collects more taxes from the individuals whose
T is close to  t but looses tax revenue for the very rich whose T is well above  t. Obviously,
whether the net eect is positive depends on the relative number of taxpayers in these
two groups: that is the number of super-rich individuals relative to the number of rich
23individuals. Exactly the same logic applies in the Mirrlees (1971) model with unbounded
income distributions (Diamond (1998), Saez (2001)).
It turns out that, as in the Mirrlees (1971) model, the Pareto distributions are of
central importance. When the top tail is Pareto distributed with parameter , then
H(a0) = 1   C=a
0 and the statistic E(log(a0= a0)ja0   a0) is constant over all values of









 [1   H( a0)]: (16)
It is well known (since the work of Pareto (1896)) that Pareto distributions approximate
extremely well the top tails of income and wealth distributions.24 Using the large mi-
croles of individual tax returns publicly released by the Internal Revenue Service in the
United States, it is possible to estimate empirically the key statistic A( a0) as a function
of  a0. More precisely, I consider capital income dened25 as the sum of dividends, in-
terest income, rents, duciary income (trust and estate income), and I plot on Figure 6
the average normalized log income above income  z for a large range of values of  z. This
statistic is remarkably stable for large values  z, around 0.65, showing that the top tail is
Paretian with a parameter  = 1:5.26 Figure 6 shows that the empirical function A( a0)
whose value must be zero for the top wealth level, remains stable around 0.6 and does not
get to zero even for very large values.27 Therefore, the Pareto distribution assumption is
24A number of studies have shown how Pareto distributions arise naturally when year to year individual
income or wealth growth is stochastic and independent of size (see e.g., Champernowne (1953) and Gabaix
(1999)).
25I exclude realized capital gains because realizations are lumpy and are not an annual stream of
income.
26Statistics compiled by the Internal Revenue Service by size of dividends since 1927, and exploited
in Piketty and Saez (2001) show that the Pareto parameter for dividend income from 1927 to 1995 has
always been around 1.5-1.7.
27In fact, if the second wealth holder has half as much wealth than the top wealth holder, then A( a0) =
log(2)  0:7 at the level of the second top wealth holder. This shows again that, as in the Mirrlees (1971)
model, the top result applies only to the top income and thus is not relevant in practice.
24clearly the best one to understand optimal taxation of the very wealthy in the current
model.
Formula (16) shows that when  < 1, then starting from a constant exemption level
a (after a large time level  t), increasing the exemption level reduces tax revenue. It can
be shown that the welfare eect of this reform is negligible relative to the tax revenue
eect. Therefore, it is optimal for the government to reduce a. As the exemption a
t must
be increasing, this implies that a
t must converge to a nite value. On the other hand,
if  > 1, then increasing a does increase tax revenue and is therefore desirable, this
implies that the function a
t diverges to innity as t grows. We can now state our main
result on optimal progressive taxation whose rigorous proof is presented in appendix.
Proposition 2 Assume that the top tail of the initial wealth distribution is Pareto with
parameter , and that the maximum tax rate is .
 If  < 1 then the threshold a
t converges to a nite limit a
1 and thus the asymptotic
wealth distribution is truncated at a
1. More precisely, a
t is constant and equal to a
1 for
t large enough.
 If    > 1 then the threshold a
t grows to innity and thus the asymptotic wealth
distribution is unbounded. The Pareto parameter of the asymptotic wealth distribution is
also equal to .
Proposition 2 shows that two parameters aect critically the desirability of capital
income taxation to curb large wealth holdings. First, and as expected from Section 3, the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution matters. The higher this elasticity, the larger the
behavioral response to capital income taxation, and the less ecient are capital income
taxes. Second and interestingly, the thickness of the top tail of the wealth distribution
matters. The thinner the top tail of the distribution (as measured by the Pareto parameter
), the less desirable are capital income taxes. The intuition for this result is clear and is
similar to the one obtained in the Mirrlees (1971) model of static labor income taxation.
If the wealth distribution is thin, providing a tax break in the form of a higher exemption
25level for the rich is good for the wealth accumulation of the rich and bad for tax revenue
collected from the super-rich. Therefore, granting the tax break is good when the number
of super-rich is small relative to the number of rich individuals. Finally, it is important
to note that the asymptotic wealth distribution results are independent of the maximum
tax rate , however small it is.
As discussed in Section 3, the case for using capital income taxation would be weaker
if labor income y were positively related to initial wealth a0.28 In other words, capital
income taxation should be used to tax rich rentiers but would be less desirable to tax the
working rich.
5 Numerical Simulations and Policy Implications
The goal of the numerical simulations is to analyze how large is the asymptotic threshold
level a (when it is nite) and how long time does it take to reduce large wealth holdings
corresponding to various upper percentiles of the wealth distribution down to the threshold
a. In particular, we want to know how these outcomes vary with the key parameters
 (intertemporal elasticity of substitution),  (Pareto parameter of the initial wealth
distribution), and  (the exogenous upper-bound for the tax rate).
For the numerical simulations, we normalize the wage level w to one. We calibrate the
initial wealth distribution H(a0) as follows. We assume that the density distribution is
Pareto above some threshold  a0, and constant below  a0.29 The threshold  a0 is chosen so
that the average wealth holding produces an income stream equal to 25% of the labor in-
come stream. This calibration replicates the approximate (80%, 20%) division of personal
income into labor income and capital income. We specify a parametric step function for
a
t, with 7 steps. The time intervals are xed.30
28More precisely, it can be shown that if y  a

0, then a converges to a nite limit only if  < 1 .
29A constant density does not replicate exactly the empirical wealth distribution but this is not a
concern as we focus on asymptotic results involving only the top of the wealth distribution.
30More precisely, we have a(t) = a
0  1(0  t < t1) + a
1  1(t1  t < t2) + ::: + a
6  1(t6  t) where the
26A numerical program computes the optimal levels a
i for each step and the optimal
lumpsum benets level b for the utilitarian criterion and assuming that there is no ex-
ogenous government spending (g = 0). Extensive experimentation has been performed to
insure that the optimum step function is not sensitive to the number of steps and location
of the time intervals and thus that it is close to the unrestricted optimum a(t).31
Table 1 displays the results from the simulations. Panel A reports the asymptotic
values of the capital income stream a for the richest individuals in the long-run.32
Unsurprizingly, the optimal value of a is increasing with the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution , and the thinness of the wealth distribution measured by the Pareto
parameter . As we expect from Proposition 2, when the product    gets close to
one, the value a becomes large. Therefore, the numerical simulations provide a useful
complement to the knife-edge result of Proposition 2. While the threshold of one for
the product    is qualitatively critical, the value of the threshold is very important
quantitatively to assess how much redistribution should take place. For example, for very
low values of the product, the capital income stream of the rich in the long-run is only
a very small fraction of the labor income stream, implying a very low level of income
inequality in the long-run. For values of the product    close to one, that capital
income stream is much larger than the labor income stream, implying that, even though
very large fortunes disappear, substantial income inequality is left in the long-run.
Panel B reports, in the case of the Pareto parameter  = 1:5, the time needed for
percentiles P99 (top 1%), P99.9 (top 0.1%), and P99.99 (top 0.01%) of the initial wealth
distribution to get to the exemption threshold a
t where taxation stops.33 These results
a
i are non decreasing in i and (t1;::;t6) = (2;5;10;20;50;100) are xed step thresholds.
31We use a discrete approximation of the density distribution described in text with 2,000 points which
covers well the very top groups. Programs have been written using MATLAB software and are available
upon request.
32We present values of a instead of a in order to compare directly the capital income stream to the
labor income stream w (normalized to one).
33Column (0) shows the initial capital income streams a0 that such wealth levels generate in terms of
the wage w.
27show that the time of taxation is decreasing in the top tax rate  (because a higher tax
rate allows the government to redistribute wealth more quickly), and decreasing in the
intertemporal elasticity . A larger intertemporal elasticity implies that the exemption
threshold a is higher (because taxes are less ecient and hence less desirable), and also
that individuals run down their initial wealth more quickly. Both elements contribute to
reduce the time of taxation when  increases. These times of taxation results show that
for moderate elasticities and tax rates, it would take many decades to reduce the very top
fortunes. However, after a century of taxation, virtually all individuals, except the very
top wealth owners, would have reached the exemption threshold and thus would only hold
moderate amounts of wealth.
There is a large literature that tries to estimate the inter-temporal elasticity of substi-
tution  (see Deaton (1992) for a survey). Most studies nd that consumption patterns
are not very sensitive to the interest rate, and hence nd a small inter-temporal elasticity
of substitution , in general below 0.5.34 Pareto parameters of wealth distributions are
almost always between 1.5 and 2. Therefore, we would expect that the key condition
 < 1 is empirically statised, implying, in the context of the model developed here,
that progressive taxation should be used aggressively to reduce large wealth holdings.
6 Extending the Basic Model
6.1 Endogenous interest rate and wages
Previous sections have considered the case with an exogenous interest rate rt =  and
wage rate w, corresponding to the small open economy assumption. It is an interesting
question to know how our results are aected in the closed economy case with a neo-
classical production function f(k) where k denotes capital per capita. In that situation,
34The earliest studies based on macro data such as Hall (1988) found very small elasticities around
0.1. Later studies based on micro data tend to nd bigger elasticities but most of the time below 0.5
(Attanasio and Weber, 1995).
28r = f0(k) and w = f(k)   rk. The initial capital stock per capita k0 is given (and equal
to the average a0 if the economy starts with no debt).
We conjecture that introducing such a neo-classical function would not change our
results. This is due to a general principle in optimal taxation theory stating that optimal
tax formulas depend essentially on consumer elasticities and not on the elasticities of
substitution in the production sector.35 It would be interesting to replicate the numerical
simulations of Section 5 in the case of endogenous interest rates and wages to see how the
quantitative results are aected.
With a neoclassical production function and no taxation, the long-run stock of capital
k1 is given by the modied Golden rule f0(k1) = . The intuition is the following. If the
rate of return is below the discount rate, individuals accumulate wealth and the capital
stock increases up to the point where the rate of return is reduced down to the discount
rate. If the (linear) tax on capital income is positive and equal to  in the long run, then
the stock of capital is lower and given by (1   )f0(k1) = . It is interesting to note
that the optimal set of taxes considered here always lead to the ecient level of capital
f0(k1) =  in the long-run. This is because, even if the tax is never exactly zero, the
number of individuals in the tax regime shrinks to zero. This result is a direct application
of the important point made by Piketty (2001a) that, contrarily to linear capital taxation,
progressive capital income taxation with a high enough exemption level does not lower
the long-run stock of capital in the economy. When the capital stock is smaller than the
modied Golden rule level, individuals in the exempt bracket start accumulating capital.
Therefore, in the innite horizon model, even if the rich hold a substantial fraction
of the capital stock, taxing them with progressive taxation does not have a negative
impact on the long-run capital stock because lower income people will accumulate more
and replace the capital stock lost by the rich. The model generates this important result
because everybody has the same discount rate . It is an important empirical question
35This result was rst noticed by Samuelson (1951), and then rigorously established by Diamond and
Mirrlees (1971).
29whether the currently wealthy individuals are the only ones capable of holding wealth
and that taxing that wealth away would be a disaster for the economy because poorer
individuals would spend the redistributed capital stock away. We do not believe that such
an aristocratic view of wealth accumulation is realistic and the experiences of European
countries and Japan just after World War II suggest that, when the old fortunes are
destroyed, a new generation of entrepreneurs appears and reconstitutes the capital stock
fairly quickly (see Piketty (2001b) for a detailed analysis of the French case).
6.2 Role of debt
As discussed in Section 2, with progressive (or wealth specic) capital income taxation,
dierent individuals face dierent after-tax interest rates and debt is no longer neutral
and can be used to improve welfare. An individual exempted from taxation is indierent
between one extra dollar at time 0 and et extra dollars at time t, while an individual
facing a marginal capital income tax rate  is indierent between one extra dollar at time
0 and e(1 )t extra dollars at time t. Therefore, by distributing the lumpsum benets bt
earlier on and creating debt, the government favors the low income untaxed relative to the
high incomes who are taxed.36 If no limit is set for the debt instrument, the government
would distribute innitely large lumpsum benets earlier on, and implement an innitely
large lumpsum tax later on. Therefore, to avoid this degenerate and unrealistic outcome, a
limit on the debt instrument must be introduced. That is why we introduced assumption
2 in Section 2. Introducing other forms of debt limits such as period by period budget
balance (where taxes equal transfers plus government spending at any point in time), or
a nite limit on the size of debt, or an absolute limit on the size of lumpsum benets or
transfers, would not aect the asymptotic results obtained in Sections 3 and 4.37
36Clearly, and as shown by Chamley (1986), this issue does not arise with uniform linear capital income
taxation where debt is neutral.
37The presentation would have been more tedious as the income stream yt would no longer have been
constant. The value of y (which appears in Proposition 1) would also have been dierent.
306.3 General Welfare Functions
In the derivations carried out so far, we have assumed that the government maximizes a
utilitarian criterion. In that case, the social marginal value of an extra dollar given at time
zero to an individual with wealth a0 is given by @U=@a0 = u0(c0) = c
 1=
0 . As c0 grows
to innity when initial wealth a0 grows without bound, we see that the social marginal
utility of the rich goes to zero as wealth goes to innity. Therefore, the government hardly
values marginal wealth of the very rich and thus the optimal tax systems that we have
considered are designed to extract the maximum amount of tax revenue from the highest
fortunes (soak the rich).
The important question we want to address here is how are our results modied if we
assume that the social marginal value of wealth of the rich converges to some positive
limit instead of zero. Therefore, let us extend our initial model and consider that the gov-
ernment maximizes some general social welfare function of the form
R
A0 G(U(a0))dH(a0),
where G(:) is a (weakly) increasing function. The direct social marginal value of wealth
of individual a0 (expressed in terms of the value of public funds) is now given by (a0) =
G0(U(a0))  u0(c0)=p where p is the multiplier of the government budget constraint. In
the presence of income eects, giving one dollar at time zero to an individual with ini-
tial wealth a0 produces, in addition to the direct welfare eect, a change in behavior
and hence a change in tax revenue T = dTax(a0)=da0. This extra-tax revenue can be
rebated to the same individual, producing an extra welfare eect, and an extra income
eect. Assuming that the extra tax is always rebated to the taxpayer, the net social
marginal welfare eect of giving one dollar is g(a0) = ((a0)=p)(1 + T + T 2 + :::) =
((a0)=p)=(1   dTax(a0)=da0).
The curve of net marginal social weights g(a0) describes how the government values
giving a marginal dollar at any level of the wealth distribution and thus summarizes in
a transparent way the redistributive tastes of the government. If the government has
redistributive tastes, then g(a0) is decreasing. We denote by  g the limit value of g(a0)
31when a0 grows to innity.38 When  g > 0, our two propositions are modied as follows.
Proposition 3 In the wealth specic linear tax situation of Proposition 1, if  < 1    g,
then the asymptotic wealth distribution is bounded, and the asymptotic top wealth level is
such that a1(a0) =   y=(1    g   ). If  > 1    g, then the optimal time of taxation
converges to a nite limit and the asymptotic wealth distribution is unbounded.
In the situation of Proposition 2, if    < 1    g then the exemption threshold a
t
converges to a nite level and the asymptotic wealth distribution is truncated. If  > 1  g
then a
t grows to innity and the asymptotic wealth distribution is unbounded and Paretian
with parameter .
The proof is presented in appendix. Therefore, caring for the rich at the margin does
have an impact on our results, and the condition needed to obtain a bounded asymptotic
wealth distribution is stringer. However, for realistic values of  and ,  g would need to
be very large to reverse the truncated asymptotic wealth distribution result. For example,
with  = 0:25, and  = 1:5, any  g below 0.625 is enough to obtain the truncated wealth
distribution.
When the government does not care about redistribution, it sets equal marginal
weights g(a0) for all individuals. Suppose that the government is then restricted to using
distortionary capital income taxation to nance an exogenous amount of public spending
G. In that situation, whether the asymptotic wealth distribution is truncated depends on
the level of exogenous spending G. If G is low, the marginal eciency cost of taxation is
low and the asymptotic wealth distribution is unbounded. However, there is a threshold
for public spending  G above which the eciency cost of taxation becomes high enough
that it becomes ecient for the government to tax the rich sharply so that the asymptotic
wealth distribution is truncated.
38In the utilitarian case, we have  g = 0 as described above.
327 Conclusion
This paper has shown that introducing progressive taxation in the optimal dynamic capi-
tal income tax model can have a dramatic impact on policy prescriptions. In the standard
model with linear taxes, capital income taxes are zero after a nite time, and therefore
the wealth distribution cannot be radically changed by capital income taxation. In con-
trast, under realistic assumptions on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the
thickness of the top tail of the distribution, progressive taxation should be used to reduce
all large fortunes down to a nite level. As a result, the long-run wealth distribution is
truncated above and wealth inequality is drastically reduced.
There are a number of limitations in the model that should be emphasized. First,
the innite horizon model might not be a good representation of savings and wealth
accumulation behavior. It is certainly not fully realistic to think that consumers can be
so far-sighted. Moreover, the model requires everybody to have the same discount rate
otherwise equilibria are degenerated. It is perhaps the case that the innite horizon model
predicts too large responses to capital income taxes. However, this feature should bias
the results against nding redistributive policies desirable.39 It is therefore remarkable
that the innite horizon model produces tax policy recommendations so favorable to the
breaking of large fortunes and redistribution of wealth.
Second, in the model presented here, the initial unequal wealth distribution is given
exogenously. As mentioned in Section 2, the obvious rst best policy would be to conscate
and redistribute wealth from the start once and for all. There are perhaps political
constraints preventing the government from applying such a drastic policy. In that case,
it is of interest to note that the eects of the optimal capital income taxes proposed here
do not depend on the maximum tax rate that the government can set. In the historical
record of tax policy development of western countries, wealth inequality inherited from the
past and the tremendous levels of the largest fortunes accumulated during the industrial
39The Chamley-Judd results stating that optimal capital income taxes should be zero in the long-run
have often been criticized on these grounds.
33revolutions was certainly one of the key arguments put forward by the proponents of
progressive income taxation. Therefore, the analysis of limited wealth redistribution tools
such as progressive capital income taxation (as opposed to direct wealth conscation) is
certainly relevant in practice.
Obviously, it is an interesting and important research question to understand how
the results of this paper would be aected if the wealth distribution were endogenous.
As mentioned in introduction, numerous papers have extended the basic innite horizon
model to study the dynamics of the wealth distribution (see Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997)
for a survey). The important question of how optimal taxes should be set in that context
is left for future research.
34Appendix
 Proof of Proposition 1
The denominator in equation (6), 1   (1   )e T, is between 1 and  for any value
of T, therefore c0 ! +1 when a0 tends to innity. The envelope theorem implies that







0 [y   c0e
 T]:



































The rst term is the welfare eect and the last two terms are the tax revenue eect. As
c0 ! 1, the welfare eect is negligible relative to [y c0e T]. This expression appears in
the numerator of the second term of (17) multiplied by a factor bounded away from zero
and innity for all values of T. Therefore, the welfare eect is negligible in the asymptotic
analysis of (17).
 Case  < 1:
In that situation, c0e T must be bounded otherwise the bracketed expression of the
second term in (17) takes arbitrarily large positive values (as y is constant) and the third
term of (17) is also positive, implying that (17) cannot hold. Therefore c0e T is bounded
implying that T ! 1 because c0 ! 1. Thus the rst term (welfare eect) and the third
term in (17) both tend to zero. Therefore (17) holds only if the second term also converges
to zero, that is, (1 )c0e T ! y, implying that c1 = cT ! y=(1 ). As consumption
35and wealth are constant after T, we have c1 = a1+y, and thus a1(a0) ! y=((1 ))
which proves (8).
 Case  > 1:
In that situation, the behavioral response in c0 unambiguously reduces tax revenue
and thus the second term in (17) is negative and must be compensated by the positive
third term in (17). In that case T must be bounded because otherwise the third term in
(17) would be negligible relative to c0e T and (17) could not hold. As T is bounded
and as c0 ! 1, the dominant terms proportional to c0 in (17) must cancel each other,
implying that:
(1   )e T





A simple analysis shows that this equation denes a unique T 1 which must be the limit
of T(a0) when a0 grows to innity. One can note that T 1 decreases with  and tends
to innity when  decreases to one. Using (5) and (6), it is then easy to obtain the
asymptotic formula for a1(a0). QED.
 Proof of Proposition 2
The objective of the government is to choose the path (a
t) and b so as to maximize
the sum of utilities subject to the budget constraint as described in Section 2.2. Let us
assume that a
t is the optimal path for the exemption level. We assume that the tax rate
above a
t is equal to the exogenous value  = 1. The proof and results would be identical
for any  > 0 but the expressions would be greatly complicated.
As shown in the text, for each a0, two equations dene implicitly c0 and T:
c0 =
[y + (y  T + A
T + a0)]
1   (1   )e T ; c0e
 T = a

T + y: (18)
We consider, as in the text, a small increase (or decrease) a of a
t for t   t. More
precisely, as the post-reform exemption path must be non-decreasing, we assume that
the derivative of the exemption path a
t
0 is increased locally (between  t    t and  t) by
36an amount a0 such that a0   t = a, eectively producing an increase a in a
t for
t   t. In the case where a
 t
0 = 0, it is impossible to decrease a
t uniformly above  t and the
constraint a
 t








Dierentiating the expressions in (18), and eliminating T, we obtain:
c0 =
(1 + T)
1 + T   (1 + T(1   ))e T












1 + T   (1   T)e (1+)T















0(c0)(T    t): (22)
Let us carry the asymptotic analysis  t ! 1. In that case, T ! 1 and we assume rst
that T converges to  . We denote by o(1) a quantity converging to zero when  t ! 1.




(T    t)  
1




We now change variables from T to a0. Using (18), for T large, c0 = a0(1 + o(1)).
Therefore, using c0e T = a
T + y, we have
T = loga0 + log()   log(y + a

T) + o(1): (24)
Integrating (19) from  t to T, we have log(y + a
T)   log(y + a
 t) = (T    t)[  + o(1)].
Hence, taking the dierence of equations (24) for T and  t (corresponding to wealth levels
a0 and  a0 respectively), we have
(T    t) =
1






















For large T and  t, using (21) and (22), we have the following approximation formulas for
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As c0 ! 1 when a0 ! 1, asymptotically, equations (27) and (28) show that the welfare
eect U(a0) is negligible relative to the tax eect Tax(a0) and can be ignored in the
asymptotic analysis.
Assuming that a0 is Pareto distributed in the tail with parameter , a simple inte-













 [1   H( a0)]: (29)
 If  < 1, then (29) implies that decreasing a
t increases tax revenue. Therefore, it
must be the case that the constraint a
t
0  0 is binding asymptotically, meaning that a
t
is constant for t large enough which proves the rst part of Proposition 2.
 If  > 1, then then (29) implies that increasing a
t increases tax revenue. As
it is always possible to increase a
t, it must be the case that t is not converging to a
nite value but diverging to innity. In that case, integrating equation (19) implies that
T=log(y + a
T) = o(1). Therefore (24) implies log(a
T + y) = (1 + o(1))log(a0), and
hence log(a1(a0)) = (1 + o(1))log(a0). Therefore, the asymptotic wealth distribution is
also Pareto distributed with parameter . QED.
 General Welfare Function
 Wealth Specic Tax
38With the general welfare function, the rst term (corresponding to the welfare eect)
in the rst order condition (17) must be replaced by (a0)(y   c0e T) = g(a0)(1  
dTax(a0)=da0)(y   c0e T). Using (4), we have 1   dTax(a0)=da0 = (=(1 + ))  (1 +





1   (1   )e T
h





 (+1)T = 0: (30)
The remaining of the proof parallels the proof of Proposition 1. The two cases to be
distinguished are  < 1    g and  > 1    g. In the former, we have (1    g   )c0e T !
(1    g)y, and hence a1(a0) ! y  =(1    g   ), as stated in Proposition 3.
 Progressive Income Tax
In that case, routine but tedious computations show that




1 +    (1   )e (1+)T




Therefore, adding the welfare eect W(a0) = G0(U(a0))U(a0)=p to the tax eect
Tax(a0), and using equations (27) and (28), we obtain





1 +  
 
1









Therefore, integrating over the population with a0   a0 as in Proposition 2, the total
welfare and tax revenue eect is
W + Tax =
a
(1 + )(1 +  )

  




 [1   H( a0)]: (32)
Therefore the same analysis as in Proposition 2 applies and the two cases to be distin-
guished are  < 1    g and  > 1    g. QED.
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FIGURE 6: Empirical Statistic A(z0)=E(log(z/z0)|z>z0) for capital income
$0 $200K $400K $600K $800K $1,000K
Capital Income z0
year 1996
year 19880.25 0.5 1 0.25 0.5 1 0.25 0.5 1
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A. Asymptotic Top Capital Income Streams ρρρρ  a*
Pareto Parameter α
1.5 0.049 0.073 0.155 0.158 0.259 0.697 0.501 1.098 3.216
2 0.180 0.270 0.708 1.340 3.955 6.444 infinite infinite infinite
2.5 0.440 0.725 4.868 infinite infinite infinite infinite infinite infinite
B. Years of taxation for various upper percentiles (Pareto Parameter αααα =1.5)
Percentiles Initial Wealth 
ρ a0
P99 1.46 64.2 15.1 9.1 25.1 9.3 5.3 8.1 5.2 4.1
P99.9 6.79 210.6 95.8 47.3 114.8 52.7 17.1 63.6 15.9 6.3
P99.99 31.40 523.5 233.0 95.7 287.4 132.5 55.4 192.0 78.1 20.7
Panel A reports the asymptotic top capital income stream ρ a* expressed in terms of the normalized
annual labor income stream w=1 for various values of σ, τ,  and α . 
Panel B reports the number of years needed for various upper wealth percentiles to reach the exemption
threshold a* where taxation stops for various values of  σ,  and τ  (and α=1.5).
Column (0) reports the initial capital income levels ρ a0 (in terms of the annual labor income stream w) of each percentile.
The government maximizes a utilitarian criterion. The discount factor ρ= 0.05, and exogenous government spending g is zero. 
TABLE 1: Simulations of Top Capital Incomes in the Long-run and Time of Taxation
Intertemporal Elasticity σ=0.6
Marginal Tax Rate τ Marginal Tax Rate τ
Intertemporal Elasticity σ=0.25
Marginal Tax Rate τ
Intertemporal Elasticity σ=0.45